CEE Quarterly

Turmoil in Europe
The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on CEE

• Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could be a watershed moment for Europe’s political and
  economic landscape.
• Comprehensive sanctions could affect CEE’s trade with Russia and also domestic sectors
  in which Russian investment is important, such as energy and metals. Sanctions are already
  leading to higher commodity prices and lower commodity imports from Russia
• Russian countersanctions and other measures are likely to impact CEE through the ban on
  food exports (with Turkey hardest hit), RUB payments for Russian gas (with the Balkans the
  most at risk), potential spillovers on risk appetite from Russia’s capital controls.
• If Russia continues to export oil and gas to Europe, we expect its economy to shrink by
  around 12% this year (peak-to-trough of around 20%), with a muted rebound in 2023 akin to
  stagnation. In EU-CEE1 and in the Western Balkans, GDP is expected to grow by around
  2.3% in 2022 and by 3.6% in 2023. The direct impact of the conflict on GDP growth is
  estimated at 1.5-3pp in 2022 and up to 1.5pp in 2023. Turkey could grow by around 4% this
  year and 3.8% in 2023.
• We expect CEE to gradually reduce its dependency on Russian hydrocarbons with help from
  NextGenerationEU (NGEU). CEE governments might help households and companies
  weather higher commodity prices by incurring larger budget deficits. However, a new
  common EU fund might be needed to fight rapid price increases.
• If the EU stops importing oil and gas from Russia, the Russian economy could shrink by
  around 20% this year and fail to rebound in 2023. In such a scenario, EU-CEE and the
  Western Balkans would probably fall into recession.
• Inflation could reach 30-year highs due to rapidly rising commodity and food prices, and
  supply-chain bottlenecks. We expect inflation to end this year at or above 10% in Central
  Europe, at around 35% in Russia and at close to 60% in Turkey. Inflation targets could be
  missed again in 2023 amid persistent supply shocks.
• We expect rates to be hiked to 6% in Hungary and Poland, 4.75% in Czechia, 4% in Romania
  and 2% in Serbia. Central banks are likely to intervene in FX markets to avoid depreciation
  above EUR-HUF 380, EUR-PLN 4.80 and EUR-RON 5.00 (with the NBR probably relaxing
  this stance if the conflict in Ukraine ends).
• Liquidity management and FX interventions could keep interbank interest rates above 5%
  and push forward implied interest rates into double digits in times of stress. Thus, we see
  little scope for positioning against CEE currencies, especially in Romania and Serbia.
• In our view, the main political consequences of the conflict in Ukraine are the following:
  1. Russia is likely to drift further away from the West, both economically and politically;
  2. Relations between Turkey and NATO are likely to improve; 3. Poland could become more
  engaged in European affairs and regional politics, moving closer to the EU. NGEU money
  could be unblocked for both Poland and Hungary; 4. Hungary could become more isolated
  in the EU and in the Visegrad group; 5. Serbia might be forced to choose between the EU
  and Russia; 6. The EU could increase its involvement in the political crisis affecting Bosnia-
  Herzegovina; 7. Economic shocks might fuel political instability in Slovenia and Romania;
  8. Despite support from EU-CEE, Ukraine is unlikely to become an EU member any time
  soon.

Source: UniCredit Research - CEE Quarterly, 30 March 2022, Executive summary